Russell S. Stickle v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1952
Russell S. Stickle v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. :
Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Rawlings, Wallace, Roberts & Black; Richard C. Dibble; Counsel for Appellant;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Stickle v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., No. 7831 (Utah Supreme Court, 1952).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1742
Case No. 7831 
IN THE SUPRErvm COURT 
of the · 
STATE OF UTAH 
RUSSELLS. S.TICKLE, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COM-
pANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
I:. L._ 'I;""'R~,INGS, WALLACE, ROBERTS ~ -k!ACK 
A1 J 1 ~~ ~·~!CHARD C. DIBBLEE 
530 Judge Building 
- - - - - - -. - -- - --~ -- --<. · --... -~ --- - - --T- -~1\"rt Lak Cit Utah ( . tt u r t:m e Court, l: ah'a e Y' 
. Counsel for Appellant 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE -------------------------------------------------- 1 
STATEMENT OF POINTS -------------------------------------------------------- 7 
ARGUMENT --------------------------- ___ ----------------------- ___ ___ _ ____ __ _______ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 7 
POINT 1. PLAINTIFF WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT 
TO A JURY TRIAL IN VIOLATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION AND APPLICABLE AUTHOR-
ITIES __ . ____ . _ ------------ _______________ . ________ . _ _ _ __ _ _ _ __ __ _ __ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 7 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLD-
ING THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF 
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS MATTER 
0 F LAW ------------- ____ ----------------------------_ __ ___ _ _ _ _ __________ _______ __ 10 
POINT III. THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL EVI-
DENCE INTRODUCED THAT THE DEFEN-
DANT WAS NEGLIGENT IN THAT IT FAILED 
TO REPAIR OR TO GIVE WARNING OF THE 
BROKEN TIE BAND TO PERSONS WHO 
WOULD UNLOAD THE TANKS FROM THE 
FLATCAR -------------------------------------- ______________ . _ -------------- __ 25 
CON CL USI 0 N ----------------------------------------------- _______________________ --- ____ - 30 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
Erie R. Co. v. Murphy, 108 F. 2d 817 -----------------------------------~ 15, 28 
Folsom v. Lowden, 157 Kan. 328, 139 P. 2d 822________________________ 13 
Hanson v. Ponder, 300 S.W. 35 ---------------------------------------------------- 28 
Heaven v. Pender, L. R. 11 Q. B. Div. 503 ---------------------------------- 28 
Ladd v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 193 Mass. 359, 
79 N .E. 7 42 ------------------------------------ __________ -------------------------------- 27 
Lewis v. Southern Pac. Co., (Cal. App.) 220 P. 2d 431____________ 19 
Locke v. Red River Lumber Co., 65 Cal. App. 2d 322, 
150 p. 2d 506 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 23 
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Freppon, 134 Ky. 650, 121 S.W. 454.. 17 
Maher v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 278 F. 431-------------------- 16 
Malizia v. Oregon Short LineR. Co., 53 Utah 122, 
178 p. 756 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS- Continued 
PAGE 
Mickelson v. Erie R. Co., 106 N.J.L. 147, 147 A. 535________________ 15 
Moore v. Miles, 108 Utah 167, 158 P. 2d 676 ------------------------------ 10 
Newton v. Oregon Short LineR. Co., 43 Utah 219, 134 P. 567 9 
Oklahoma City-Ada-Atoka Ry. Co. v. Riddle, 182 Okl. 318, 
82 p. 2d 304 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 18 
Paul v. Georgia Railway & Banking Co., 60 Ga. App. 461, 
4 S.E. (2d) 99 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 13 
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Hummel, 167 F. 89 -------------------------------- 15 
Raymond v. Union Pac. R. Co., 113 Utah 26, 191 P. 2d 137______ 26 
Shortino v. Salt Lake & U. R. Co., 52 Utah 476, 174 P. 860____ 8 
St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Ewan, 26 F. 2d 619____________ 28 
Steed v. Rio Grande W. Ry. Co., 29 Utah 448, 82 P. 476.________ 10 
Stoutimore v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 338 Mo. 463, 
92 s. w. 2d 658 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 20 
Van Horn v. Wyoming Game & Fish Com., 54 Wyo. 346, 
92 p. 2d 560 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 22 
Waldron v. Director General of Railroads, 266 Fed. 196 __ ·________ 20 
TEXTS CITED 
41 A.L.R. 58 ___________________ ----------------------------------_ ------------------------------ 28 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
RUSSELL S. STICKLE, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COM-
pANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 7831 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(Numbers in parentheses refer to pages of the 
record.) 
The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant 
(109-112) and from the judgment entered thereon plain-
tiff prosecutes this appeal. 
This is an action brought by plaintiff, an employee of 
Rademann Guisto Co., building contractors, against the 
Union Pacific Railroad Company for injuries received by 
him in unloading a car delivered to his employer by the 
said railroad company. Workmen's compensation was ob-
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tained by plaintiff from the insurance carrier of his em-
ployer. The insurance carrier signed a Waiver (Exhibit 
"J"), wherein the carrier waived its right of subroga-
tion and con sen ted that plain tiff herein could commence 
and maintain the action in his own name against the 
Union Pacific Railroad Company. 
The trial court in granting defendant's motion for 
a directed verdict held that the evidence would support 
a finding that the defendant company was negligent in 
sending a car to be unloaded which it knew had a defec-
tive metal strap and which strap was usually and custo-
marily used to unload cars loaded as was the flatcar here 
(110). 
The trial court based his ruling on the proposition 
that he believed plaintiff was guilty of contributory 
negligence as a matter of law and that if the railroad 
company could see and discover upon reasonable in-
spection the defective strap·, then the plaintiff also could 
have seen this condition and his failure to see constituted 
contributory negligence on his part (110). Thus the court 
failed to make a distinction between the fact that it was 
the duty of the railroad company to inspect and that it 
was not the duty of plaintiff to make an inspection. He 
did, in fact, make a test of the strap involved by placing 
his weight upon it before mounting to the top of the tank 
involved (16). 
The injury occurred on the 7th day of December, 
1949, at ap·proximately 1 :30 p.m., in the yards of the 
Pacific Fruit Express at Pocatello, Idaho (12). The 
plaintiff was a steel worker employed by Rademann-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
Guisto Construction Co1npany and engaged in the erec-
tion of buildings for the Pacific Fruit Express. On the 
date above 1nentioned, the plaintiff and others were as-
signed the task of unloading two large steel storage tanks 
(1:2). These tanks were loaded on a flatcar which had 
been delivered by the defendant to the yards in which 
plaintiff 'vas working (12). 
These t\vo tanks were the same size and were loaded 
on the one flatcar. Each tank was cylindrical in shape, 
approximately 10 to 12 feet in diameter, 20 feet in length 
and weighed 27,000 and 30,000 pounds respectively (13 
and Exhibit±). 
The tanks were placed on the flatcar end to end. 
These tanks rested on cribbing on top of the flatcar and 
each tank was held down by two metal straps which were 
attached to the sides of the flatcar and extended over the 
top of the tanks. These metal straps were 3 to 4 inches 
in width and approximately an eighth of an inch thick, 
there being testimony that this band was similar to de-
fendant's Exhibit 5. The straps were attached to each 
side of the boxcar by being looped over a metal band 
which went around the side of the flatcar. The end of 
the strap was clamped to the other portion of the strap, 
thereby forming a loop encircling the metal band on the 
flatcar (15). 
This flatcar was spotted by the defendant in the 
yards where plaintiff was working. The car had to be 
towed by truck down to the place where it was. to be un-
loaded ( 12-13) . 
Prior to the spotting of this car it had been inspected 
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by the defendant company (80). The defendant called the 
witness George H. Cutler, who was the person in charge 
of the inspection. Cutler identified defendant's Exhibit 
1 as indicating that the inspection on this particular 
car had disclosed there was a broken tie band (81). The 
witness testified that he had. no recollection of this car 
being bad ordered independent of Exhibit 1 (82). He 
stated that it was the customary practice to place on 
every car that is bad ordered a bad order card similar to 
defendant's Exhibit 2. This would be attached to the car 
with a stapling machine and where there was a defect 
such as discovered in this case, they would place the bad 
order card so that the side specifying light repairs would 
be facing out (82). This witness also testified that a car 
like this flatcar, having a broken tie band, was supposed 
to be sent to the rip track to be repaired (87). This wit-
ness did not know whether the car was taken to the rip 
track or not. He also testified: 
"Q. Well, I am saying ordinarily if there is a 
broken tie band on it they would take it in 
and repair it, wouldn't they~ 
"A. Well, ordinarily. 
"Q. Because one of those tie bands can be used 
for one of two things, either for unloading or 
to hold the storage tank in place, isn't that 
right~ 
"A. y . es, sir. 
"Q. Isn't that right~ 
"A. y . es, sir. 
"Q. Now you say the cards are finally taken off 
when they get to the rip track~ 
"A. The repair track, yes, sir. 
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•'Q. Or the repair track, yes, and tmtil that time 
they remain on, I take it 0? 
''A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. .A .. nd, of course your only job is just to bad 
order the car and put that on and you leave it 
up to the other people what should be done 
'vith it~ 
".A. Yes, sir." 
The witness testified that as a rule these cards are 
put on the decking of a flatcar. By this he apparently 
meant on the side of the car (90). Through leading ques-
tions defendant's counsel got the witness to testify that 
a broken tie band would not render travel unsafe to the 
point where the car would be unloaded and that it would 
be safe to move from the point of inspection to the custo-
mer (90-91). He conceded, however, that if he figured 
these straps would be used in unloading the car, he would 
see to it that they were fixed before the car was sent to 
the customer (92). 
When the car was finally spotted for loading, it was 
on a track running in a north and south direction. Crib-
bing had been placed in position on the ground upon 
which the tank was to be placed. The first strap· to be used 
was that on the south end of the car. The plaintiff used a 
blowtorch in cutting the strap on the east side. The usual 
and customary method of unloading a tank such as this 
from a flatcar, was to place cables underneath the tank 
and to attach the ends of the cable to a crane, then to hoist 
the tank from the flatcar and finally lower it onto the crib-
bing prepared for it. This necessitated the presence of a 
man on top of the tank in order to connect the cables to 
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the crane. One of the usual and customary ways for the 
1nan to place himself on top of the tank was to climb up 
the side of the tank, using the strap to pull himself on top 
(16). Before the plaintiff ascended the strap, he placed 
his weight on it to see if it would hold him (16). It did 
and seemed solid and secure (36) and he then commenced 
to ascend. When he was almost on top, the strap broke 
on the other or west side and he fell to the ground on his 
f~et and suffered severe fractures in his ankles and legs 
(16, 18). 
As plaintiff fell, he carried with him the strap, pull-
ing it down onto the east side of the car (17). After he 
was made as comfortable as possible, examination was 
made of the strap where it had broken. It appeared that 
a quarter of an inch or less showed a bright clean break 
and the rest of the break showed that it was corroded 
and rusted, thereby indicating that it had been broken for 
some period of time (17, 55). 
Neither the plaintiff (47, 106) nor the foreman (56, 
105) saw any bad order card on the car and they were 
not informed of the fact that anything was wrong or 
defective about the metal strap which had been broken. 
They made no inspection of the band because they knew 
that the railroad company made inspection before the 
cars were unloaded by the consignee ( 48) and relied upon 
that inspection and upon the assumption that the bands 
or straps were in first class shape ( 43). In further dis-
cussing this break the plaintiff's witnesses stated that 
they would not notice this break unless they were looking 
for it (55-56) and examined it for that purpose (17, 44). 
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The foregoing evidence is substantially all that re-
lates to the question of liability in this case. We will not 
detail the medical evidence because it is not of importance 
on the question before the court. All that need be said 
is that the plaintiff "~as seriously injured, remained in 
the hospital fron1 four to five months, was unable to work 
for a period of a year and the injuries have caused per-
manent disability. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFF WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO A JURY 
TRIAL IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AP-
PLICABLE AUTHORITIES. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI-
GENCE AS MATTER OF LAW. 
POINT III. 
THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE INTRODUCED 
THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT IN THAT IT 
FAILED TO REPAIR OR TO GIVE WARNING OF THE 
BROKEN TIE BAND TO PERSONS WHO WOULD UNLOAD 
THE TANKS FROM THE FLATCAR. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFF WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO A JURY 
TRIAL IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AP-
PLICABLE AUTHORITIES. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
We strenuously assert that the ruling of the court 
in directing a verdict and refusing to permit the jury to 
determine the facts has resulted in a denial to plaintiff 
of his right to a trial by jury. 
When a tribunal has been selected to determine con-
flicting and disputed issues of fact, the right of that 
tribunal to make the determination should remain invio-
late. 
Where reasonable minds may differ upon the finding 
of a factual proposition, then the jury should be permit-
ted to make the determination and the court should not 
usurp its function. We respectfully submit that the trial 
judge usurped the function of the jury in this case. 
This court in the case of Shortino v. Salt Lake & U. 
R. Co., 52 Utah 476, 174 P. 860, at page 866 set forth the 
rule to be followed by trial courts in determining whether 
or not a case should be submitted to the jury. This court 
stated: 
"That the question of contributory negligence 
on the part of the plaintiff, like that of the negli-
gence of the defendant, is for the jury, where the 
evidence and the inferences to be deduced there-
from are such that reasonable men may arrive at 
different conclusions, has so often been decided 
by this court that the proposition has, in effect, 
become elementary. 
"In other words, if there is any substantial 
doubt whether a plaintiff was or was not guilty of 
contributory negligence, or whether, if negligent, 
such negligence was the proximate cause of the 
injury, the court cannot determine the right to 
recover as a matter of law, but must submit the 
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question of contributory negligence or of proxi-
mate cause, or both, to the jury as questions of 
fact." 
Again this court stated in Newton v. Oregon Short 
LineR. Co., 43lTtah 219, 13± P. 567, 570: 
""\Vhere, therefore, the circumstances are such 
that it may reasonably be said that different 
n1inds, in viewing and considering the evidence, 
n1ight arriYe at different conclusions with respect 
to 'vhether or not the injured person exercised 
ordinary care, the question of negligence must of 
necessity be determined as one of fact and not of 
law. vVhile the substance of the foregoing state-
ment is often found in the books and may be said 
to be a correct statement of the doctrine, yet such 
statements often leave the reader in doubt whether 
a given case falls within or without the doctrine. 
But, notwithstanding this, it is impossible to for-
mulate a rule by which all cases can be determined. 
"All that can be said is that, unless the ques-
tion of. negligence is free from doubt, the court.· 
cannot pass upon it as a question of law; that is, if 
after considering all the evidence and the infer-
ences that may be deduced therefrom the court is 
in doubt whether reasonable men, in· viewing and 
considering all the evidence, might arrive at dif-
ferent conclusions, then this very doubt deter-
mines the question to be one of fa~t f6r the jury 
and not one of law for the court. T~he court can·· 
pass upon the question of negligence ·only in cle~r 
cases. All others should be submitted to the j~ry. 
The reason of this is apparent from the fact :that 
in this state all questions of fact are for the jury; 
and therefore, unless it is clear that in viewing 
and considering the evidence reaso~able minds 
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might not arrive at different conclusions, the case 
should go to the jury." 
To the same effect see Malizia v. Oregon Short Line 
R. Co., 53 Utah 122, 178 P. 756 and Steed v. Rio Grande 
W. Ry. Co., 29 Utah 448, 82 P. 476. 
We submit that under the foregoing rules the refusal 
of the trial court to permit determination of this case 
by a jury constituted a violation of plaintiff's right to 
a trial by jury, the tribunal selected to hear and deter-
mine issues of fact. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI-
GENCE AS MATTER OF LAW. 
This court has given recognition to the authorities 
heretofore cited in Moore v. Miles, 108 Utah 167, 170, 158 
P. 2d 676, wherein the court stated: 
"* * * In this jurisdiction we are committed 
to the doctrine that the question of contributory 
negligence is one for the jury, where as said in 
Carpenter v. Syrett, 99 Utah 208, 104 P. 2d 617, 
619, 'different conclusions may be reasonably 
drawn by different minds from the same evidence 
* * * ' " .
We submit that reasonable minds could reach dif-
ferent conclusions on the proposition of whether or not 
the plaintiff in this case was guilty of contributory negli-
gence. 
At the very beginning the court was following an 
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entirely erroneous concept concerning contributory neg-
ligence. He took the utterly defenseless position that the 
burden of proof \Yas upon the plaintiff to free himself 
from contributory negligence. The court stated ( 111) : 
''* * *but the fact that somebody is hurt doesn't 
entitle him to take 1noney away from some-
body else who isn't responsible for his injuries 
and, of course, he must overcome and must show 
that he, himself, is not guilty of any fault that con-
tributed to his injury, because if he doesn't show 
that tmder the law he is not entitled to recover." 
Apparently the trial judge had the idea that it was 
incumbent upon plaintiff to establish by a preponderance 
of the evidence that he was not quilty of contributory 
negligence. To establish that such statement is erron-
eous certainly needs no citation of authority. 
There can be little wonder that the trial court reach-
ed the erroneous result that defendant was entitled to 
a directed verdict when it started out with the proposi-
tion that the burden was upon plaintiff to prove his free-
dom from contributory negligence. Consideration of the 
evidence in this case will clearly establish that the ques-
tion of contributory negligence was for the jury in this 
case. 
The plaintiff and his foreman had the task of un-
loading the tanks from the flatcar. Theirs was not a duty 
to inspect. Precautions might be expected from them as 
reasonably prudent persons in the performance of their 
job. As matter of fact, the plaintiff tested the strap to 
see whether or not it would bear his weight when he 
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grabbed hold of it and caused his weight to be exerted 
against the strap. The strap held his weight. A reason-
able man could well find that this test so made by plain-
tiff was all that needed to be done in the exercise of 
reasonable care, and that a reasonably prudent person 
would have done no more to protect himself. 
In making a determination of whether plaintiff 
acted with reasonable care, we must take into considera-
tion all of the surrounding circumstances. One of those 
circumstances was his knowledge that the railroad com-
pany made inspection of the cars before they were un-
loaded. The foreman stated that he knew of this custom 
and that in the unloading of cars, such custom was relied 
upon by him in unloading cars. With these men knowing 
and relying upon the inspection of the railroad, certainly 
we cannot say that all reasonable minds would necessarily 
conclude that a p·erson employed to unload the tanks 
would make minute inspection of the load and cars to 
determine whether or not they could be unloaded with 
absolute safety to himself. As indicated, the plaintiff 
did make a test and we submit that th~s test should have 
been enough to make a jury question of the proposition 
of whether or not he was in the exercise of reasonable 
care in climbing to the top of the tank after making the 
test stated. 
The courts have recognized that the railroad in effect 
represents to a consignee and his employee that a car is 
in a reasonably safe condition to be unloaded and cer-
tainly an employee should be entitled to rely upon that 
representation. 
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In Folsom v. Lowden, 157 Kan. 328, 139 P. 2d 822, 
8:26, the court stated: 
""Appellee is the delivering carrier. The gen-
eral rule is that a railway company, when it de-
livers a ear of freight to a consignee to be unload-
ed, in the absence of notice to the consignee to the 
contrary, represents to the consignee, or his em-
ployee, that the car is in reasonably safe condition 
to be unloaded." 
The court in Paul v. Georgia Railway & Banking Co., 
60 Ga. App. 461, 4 S. E. (2d) 99, found that a jury ques-
tion on contributory negligence was presented in the case. 
In doing so it determined that th·e plaintiff could rely up-
on an assumption that the defendant had discharged its 
duty toward plaintiff. In that case the plaintiff and 
others were unloading cars and as they moved the next-to-
the-last car, the last car also moved and plaintiff was in-
jured because of this movement. The defendant railroad 
company had spotted the car and plaintiff was permitted 
to rely upon the discharge by the defendant of its duty 
to adequately set the brakes on this car. The court stated: 
"* * * The petition alleged that the plaintiff 
had the right to expect that the defendant had 
exercised ordinary care in placing said car and in 
applying the brakes so that it would not move 
when the car in front of it was moved. It alleged 
that after the front car had been moved a short 
distance he discovered that the last car was rolling 
toward him about to catch him between the cars 
and that when he discovered this it was too late 
to get out of the way, although he did everything 
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possible. This allegation makes a jury question 
and it was error to sustain the general demurrer." 
The trial court in giving his reasons for directing 
a verdict stated (110-111): 
"Now in this case he is charging the railroad 
with having been negligent in that they failed to 
exercise reasonable care for his safety and the law 
says, by the same token, that the plaintiff must 
exercise reasonable care for his safety and the 
evidence in this case shows, by the plaintiff him-
self, that had he walked around and looked at 
this strap that he was about to use as a ladder to 
climb up this side of this tank that he would have 
seen that the strap was torn and that it probably 
was not safe. 
"Now the railroad, he says, should have done 
that and should have warned him. In other words, 
he is charging the railroad with the same thing 
that the evidence shows he failed to do for his 
own safety and the doctrine and well settled law 
is that if a person is himself guilty of negligenc~ 
which contributes to his own injury that that is 
fatal to his right to recover against somebody else, 
and it is on that basis that I have determined as a 
matter of law, and without any question of fact, 
that the plaintiff ought not to be permitted to re-
cover against the railroad in this instance." 
We respectfully submit that the trial court erron-
eously placed a duty of inspection on the plaintiff and 
classified that duty as being the same as the duty of the 
defendant, to make inspection of the ca.r· and its load. 
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He held as n1atter of la\Y that it \Yas inrumbent upon the 
plaintiff to make careful inspection of the strap. He re-
quired that this inspection be Inade by a visual exainina-
tion of all parts of the strap and \ve assume that he would 
be required under this ruling of the court to inspect all 
parts of the car. \Ve have found no case which imposes 
any such duty upon the plaintiff. He did make a test 
of the strap, "\vhich "\Ve believe a jury could find consti-
tuted an exercise of reasonable care in that regard. 
Because the defect in the strap could be found by 
looking for it, does not mean that plaintiff was guilty of 
negligence because he did not see it. He had no duty to 
inspect, that 'vas the duty of the defendant. If a person 
has no required duty to look, certainly the fact that he 
does not see because he did not look cannot establish 
negligence on his part as matter of law. If the defect 
could not have been seen by looking, then it would have 
been a latent defect and there would have been no liability 
on defendant. This latent defect rule seems well estab-
lished. ·see Erie R. Co. v. Murphy, 108 F. 2d 817; Mickel-
son v. Erie R. Co., 106 N.J.L. 147, 147 A. 535. There was 
no duty to inspect so far as the consignee, Rademann-
Guisto Co. was concerned. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Hum-
mel, 167 F. 89. If there was no duty on the part of plain-
tiff's employer to inspect, then certainly there was no 
duty on the part of plaintiff to make inspection. Plain-
tiff's task was to use the strap, not to inspect it, and the 
jury could have found that since he was going to use it, 
the test he applied, of his own weight, would constitute 
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an exercise of reasonable care for his own safety and 
hence would have made it a jury question. 
In the case of Maher v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 
278 F. 431, 434, the defendant delivered a car loaded with 
ice to plaintiff's employer. Plaintiff had removed some 
of the ice and delivered it to several customers. Between 
deliveries he closed the door. He noticed certain defects 
in the door, but irrespective of these defects he continued 
to use such door and the next morning while he was en-
deavoring to close the door, it came off the rail on which 
it was hung and injured him. The trial court ruled as 
matter of law that plaintiff was guilty of contributory 
negligence. The appellate court reversed. In discussing 
contributory negligence the court stated: 
"Under federal law this is a defense which 
must be affirmatively established by defendant. 
To warrant a directed verdict it must be establish-
ed conclusively. This defense may be drawn from 
the plaintiff's evidence; and in the present case the 
only evidence bearing on the subject came from 
plaintiff himself. He testified that before the in-
jury he had observed the general ramshackle con-
dition of the door and its fan-like or scissors-like 
action; but not until after the injury had he ob-
served the sag in the rail, the arch in the canopy, 
and the worn-down condition of the hanger. These 
latter things he undoubtedly could have discovered 
by inspection. They were the things which, in the 
rickety condition of the door, permitted the hanger 
to jump off of the rail. He did not discover them. 
He was a merchant, not a car inspector. Was it 
negligence for him not to have discovered them 
and thereupon to have suspended delivery of ice 
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to his custo1ners (in midsum1ner) until on his 
co1nplaint defendant had repaired the door1 Dur-
ing all of the necessary occasions on the 12th he 
opened and closed the door without injury. 'It 
"rorked hard,' but it worked. And even if his re-
tina had registered a photograph of the rail, the 
canopy, and the hanger, that would not be enough. 
For him to have apprehended the danger it would 
have been necessary for him mentally to have fol-
lowed the application of force on the edge of the 
door, to and through the boards held together only 
at the· top, to and through the hanger in its rela-
tion to rail and canopy, and to have realized the 
likelihood or possibility of the hanger's being 
forced from the rail as it came to the enlarged 
space between the rail and canopy. Compare 
Hawley v. C. B. & Q. Rid. Co., 133 Fed. 150, 152, 
153, 66 C.C.A. 216. Would a reasonably prudent 
man under the circumstances have realized that 
he must quit using the door for its intended use 
or take upon himself the consequences of its fur-
ther use J? In our opinion reasonable and fair-
minded men might differ in their answers, and 
the question should therefore have been submitted 
to the jury." 
The above case is. stronger for defendant than the 
case at bar, because here plaintiff was not aware of any 
dangerous conditions and relied upon the straps being 
in first class condition ( 43). 
In Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Freppon, 134 Ky. 650, 
121 S.W. 454, the plaintiff, an employee of a consignee, 
was injured when he attempted to open the door of the 
car. Defendant contended that he was quilty of contribu-
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tory negligence as matter of law, but this contention 
was held erroneous and the court stated : 
"* * * The point is further made that F:reppon 
was guilty of contributory negligence sufficient to 
defeat a recovery. But the facts do not authorize 
this assumption. There is no evidence that he 
knew or had reasonable- grounds to believe that 
the car door would fall if he knocked the pin out, 
or that he failed to exercise ordinary care for his 
own safety. The question of whether or not he was 
guilty of contributory negligence was fairly sub-
mitted to the jury in an instruction telling them, 
in substance, that if they believed from the evi-
dence that the plain tiff failed to use ordinary 
care in unloading the car, and was careless and 
negligent in so unloading the same, and that but 
for his own carelessness and negligence the acci-
dent and injury would not have occurred, they 
should find for the defendant." 
In Oklahoma City-Ada-Atoka Ry. Co. v. Riddle, 182 
Okl. 318, 82 P. 2d 304, the defendant contended that plain-
tiff was guilty of contributory negligence as matter of 
law. Plaintiff had been injured when he was struck by 
a falling door from a boxcar. This door had been cleated 
up to hold it in place. The plaintiff and his fellow workers 
plied these cleats from the door in attempting to open it 
and then when they tried to slide the door, it fell, causing 
the injuries indicated. Defendant's evidence was directed 
toward showing that there was a written warning "Do 
Not Open" upon the door and that it was a warning of 
a dangerous condition. Defendant contended that in vio-
lating this warning, plaintiff was guilty of contributory 
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negligence as matter of la,v. The court held that the 
question "~as one for the jury and that a jury could find 
that plaintiff "Tas exercising ordinary care for his own 
safety. In the case at bar there was evidence upon which 
a jury could find that no warning of any kind was given 
to the plaintiff. His use of the strap under those condi-
tions "Tould not be negligence as matter of law, if it was 
not negligence to atten1pt to use the door which had a sign 
prohibiting its use . 
.~..:\.nother case helpful to plaintiff is that of Lewis v. 
Soutlzern Pac. Co. (Cal. App.), 220 P. 2d 431. Plain-
tiff was _an employee of a shipper to whose yards the de-
fendant delivered a car for loading. After the car was 
loaded, plaintiff attempted to close the door. It would not 
move and a fellow employee took a pinch bar and was 
applying pressure on the door while plaintiff was at-
tempting to pull it. The door fell outward from the top 
upon plaintiff causing his injuries. A verdict was ren-
dered for plaintiff and on appeal the main contention 
by defendant was that plaintiff was guilty of negligence 
in atten1pting to close the door, and among other things 
that he should have observed the guides on the door. 
The court refused to follow this argument and stated, 
(p. 433) : 
"* * * Whether they should, acting as persons 
of ordinary care and prudence, have observed the 
defective guides and whether if they had they 
should with their knowledge have realized the 
danger were properly questions for the jury. 'Con-
tributory negligence is a question of law only when 
the court is impelled to say that from the facts 
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reason~?i~ :~eft ~.an d~aw' but one infere~ce, and 
that a;n_ lnfere'hGe .pointing .unerringly to the negli-
gence :of. the -'plaintiff contrib'llting,to·. his. injury/ 
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·.In _Stoutimore v. 4tchison, i: ~/8,. F.· Ry Co., 33B . 
. . Mo. '463, -~2 . ~- W. 2~ ~ 658, plainti-ff w~s loading cattle· · 
for shipment :oyer defend~nt's railroad. One of the cars· 
delivered by:d~f·endant had a defective·brake and because 
of this plaintiff~ w.as ~~used to fall from the top of the 
cattle car. Judgment for ~plaintiff was ·affirmed and the 
r~le. rega;rd~4g .co~tributo·i-y ~egligence was stated as 
follow~ : ., :; 
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"~. ·* * Neither can we sustain defendant's · 
contention that plaintiff was guilty of contributory 
n~egligo~nce a.s a matter of law. Plaintiff was not an · 
experienced railroad man. He was 'vorking in the 
- dark ~th the instrumentalities furnished to hin1 
by defendant. ·Under such circumstances, he could 
. . .. only.~~~- held gqilty~ of contributory negligence as. 
a iha tter; ·of law · if_ the danger of doing so is so · 
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his own safety, but there \Yere others he could have taken. 
It was held a jury question \vas 1nade. Plaintiff was en-
gaged in loading a car \Yith c_oal. He was told that the 
car brake was \Veak; that it was necessary to keep the 
coal car in control inasmuch as there was a car below on 
the same track, from which other employees were un-
loading furniture. Plaintiff proceeded to place a scotch 
on the track about a car-length below, in order to stop 
the car in case the brakes should not hold. The brakes 
were then released and when plaintiff saw that they 
would not hold, and that the scotch did not work and that 
the car would collide \v'ith the furniture car, he placed 
another piece of timber before one of the rear wheels of 
the truck. In doing so his hand was caught by the wheel 
and his arm· cut off. The trial judge directed a verdict 
for defendant. This was reversed on appeal and the court 
stated (p. 199) : 
"There was evidence that the railroad com-
pany furnished a car with a seriously defective 
brake, knowing that the brake would be depended 
on to hold the car loaded with coal on a steep 
grade, and that the defect in the brake was the 
proximate cause of the accident. If nothing else 
appeared, the liability of the railroad company 
would result. 
"The question of assumption of risk. was 
for the jury .... It is true that, after the load-
ing was half completed, the plaintiff had notice of 
his coworker's opinion that the brake was weak. 
But it had held in process of loading, and there 
is no evidence that plaintiff or his coworker, Clif-
ton, knew there was any specific defect; and the 
defendant could not put upon the plaintiff or his 
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employer the duty of diligence in discovering the 
defect. It follows that the question whether mere 
notice of weakness was under the circumstances 
sufficient to charge the plaintiff with notice of 
both the defect and the danger was for the jury. 
Nor does the evidence necessarily require the 
inference of contributory negligence. The plain-
tiff and his coworker, Clifton, expected the scotch 
to so retard the car that the brake would hold it. 
Upon the jury's view of the reasonableness of this 
precaution and expectation will depend their d~­
cision of that issue. When the plaintiff discovered 
that the brake and the scotch first provided failed 
to hold the car in control, it was not negligence 
in the emergency to try to stop the car, to save the 
life or property of others, by placing another 
scotch under the wheels, unless the action taken 
was heedles~ or reckless, or the e~ergency was 
brought about by plaintiff's own fault. The evi-
dence did not warrant the withdrawal of that ques-
tion from the jury." 
It will be noted in the foregoing case that the defend-
ant had specific knowledge of the defective brake, yet the 
question of contributory negligence was left to the, jury. 
Even though a person might have seen a dangerous 
condition if he had looked for it, does not mean that he is 
guilty of contributory negligence for not having made 
visual examination when there was no reason to antici-
pate the presence of such a dangerous condition. 
We have been unable to find any cases involving un-
loading of cars on this particular proposition, but in the 
case of Van Horn v. Wyoming Game & Fish Com .. , 54 
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Wyo. 346, 92 P. 2d 560, 562, the rules have been well 
stated as follows : 
~~* * * Here, we think the rnore pertinent prin-
ciple applicable is as held in Chicago Telephone 
Con1pany v. Cornmercial Union Assurance Co., 
Ltd., of London, 131 Ill. App. 248, that the doctrine 
of contributory negligence does not apply where it 
appears that the omission or conduct alleged to 
constitute contributory negligence was in the do-
ing or the not doing of some act or acts in relation 
to a danger not reasonably to have been appre-
hended. In the opinion in that case the decision in 
Engel v. Smith, 82 Mich. 1, 7, 46 N.W. 21, 21 Am. 
St. Rep. 549, was quoted to this effect: 'It is a 
sound rule of la-\v that it is not contributory negli-
gence not to look out for danger when there is no 
reason to apprehend any. Beach, Contrib. Neg., 
41.' 
"In Foreman v. Western Union Telegraph 
Co., 228 Ky. 300, 14 S.W. 2d 1079, 1081, the court 
declared: 'Contributory negligence is not imput-
able to any one for failing to look out for danger 
which he has no reasonable cause to apprehend.' 
Shearman and Redfield, Sec. 90, 653, 654.' 
"Said the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts in Wall v. King, 280 Mass. 577, 182 N. E. 
855, 856: 'One is bound to anticipate and p.roiVide 
against what usually happens and what is likely 
to happen, but is not bound in like manner to 
guard against what is unusual and unlikely to hap-
pen, or what, as is sometimes said, is only remote-
ly and slightly probable.' Falk v. Finkelman, 268 
Mass. 524, 527, 168 N. E. 89, 90." 
This rule is similarly stated in Locke v. Red River 
Lumber Co., 65 Cal. Ap·p. 2d 322, 150 P. 2d 506, 509. 
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The plain tiff was injured as a result of stepping into an 
open crack in the concrete floor of the defendant's store. 
Defendant contended that she was guilty of contributory 
negligence as a matter of law. The court held that this 
was a question for the jury and stated: 
"We may not hold as a matter of law that the 
plaintiff in this case was guilty of contributory 
negligence in failing to see the hole in the concrete 
floor of the aisle. We cannot say she did not use 
that degree of care which should have been exer-
cised by a reasonably prudent person under such 
circumstances. That being true, we may not inter-
fere with the finding of the court in that regard. 
The plaintiff had no previous knowledge of the 
defect in the floor. She had no reason to anticipate 
that the main aisle to the front entrance in that 
general mercantile establishment would be in a 
dangerous condition for customers to use. She had 
a right to assume the proprietor of the store would 
provide his invited customers with safe aisles in 
which to walk." 
In the case at bar there was no reason for the plain-
tiff to anticipate any defect in the strap over the tank, 
particularly in view of the fact that he knew that the 
railroad company was supposed to make an inspection. 
We submit that the trial court erred in holding that 
the burden of proof was upon the plaintiff to establish 
his freedom from contributory negligence and then super-
imposing upon this erroneous rule a finding that as a 
matter of law the plaintiff was guilty of contributory 
negligence. 
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POINT III. 
THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE INTRODUCED 
THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT IN THAT IT 
FAILED TO REPAIR OR TO GIVE WARNING OF THE 
BROKEN TIE BAND TO PERSONS WHO WOULD UNLOAD 
THE TANKS FROM THE FLATCAR. 
The trial court ruled that a jury que'Stion had been 
made on the proposition of defendant's negligence. In 
that regard the court stated (110): 
"'X O\Y of course the railroad, they can't an-
ticipate every use that a person will make of their 
facilities, such as a strap. That is the purpose· of 
the strap to hold down the load, and they can't be 
charged with knowledge that somebody may use it 
as a trapeze or a swing or as a ladder to climb 
up the tank. 
"Now the plaintiff seeks to overcome that by 
showing that the usual custom and practice in un-
loading cars was for n1en to do that and therefore 
the railroad was charged with the knowledge that 
that might be done, but from that standpoint 
the case might be submitted to a jury and they 
might conclude that the railroad didn't exercise 
all of the care that was necessary to protect the 
plaintiff in that regard. But the hurdle that I be-
lieve the plaintiff cannot overcome is the doctrine 
in law that we call contributory negligence." 
In this ruling we believe that the trial court was 
correct. However, we do not know whether defendant 
contends or will contend that the proof also failed to 
make a jury question of defendant's negligence and proxi-
nlate causation. 
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In Raymond v. Union Pa.c. R. Co., 113 Utah 26, 191 P. 
2d 137, 139, the plaintiff was an employee of a consignee 
of a car and load delivered by the Union Pacific Railroad 
Company. That same company is the defendant in the 
case at bar. With respect to the contentions there made, 
the court stated: 
"Plaintiff asserts and defendant admits that a 
railroad company will be held liable to a consignee 
or such consignee's employee if the railroad com-
pany delivers a defective car or a car with a de-
fective load and such consignee or its employees 
are injured thereby." 
We believe that such rule is well established by the 
authorities. 
In the case at bar, the defendant by its inspection 
discovered the defective strap which held the tanks in 
place. Evidence was introduced that the usual and cus-
tomary way to unload tanks from a flatcar was for a per-
son to get on top of the tank to make the necessary attach-
ment of the cables and tank to the crane. Evidence was 
also introduced showing that the usual and customary 
way of ascending the tank was to use the strap. Under 
this state of facts, the defendant should either have re~ 
paired the defective strap or should have given adequate 
warning of the condition of the strap to the consignee or 
its employees. 
One of the witnesses for the defendant company 
testified that bad ordered cars should go to the repair 
track and a car with a broken tie band, such as the car in 
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question, should have been sent to the rip track to be 
repaired ~ S7). The evidence establishes the fact that 
this tie band 'Yas never repaired and apparently the car 
was not sent to the rip track. Based upon the failure of 
the railroad to Inake the necessary repairs on thjs tie 
band, the jury could find that it failed to use reasonable 
care in protecting the consignee and its employees from 
the defectiYe condition so found, and that in placing the 
car in the yards for unloading purposes, it was guilty of 
negligence. See La.dd v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 
193 Mass. 359, 79 N. E. 7-±2, where defendant failed to 
make repairs after knowledge of a defective door. 
Contention was made by the defendant that adequate 
notice had been given by placing the bad order card on 
the car. The jury could have found that this bad order 
card 'Yas never placed upon the car, for the reason that 
the evidence on this issue was conflicting. Defendant's 
witnesses testified that they had no independent recollec-
tion of the inspection of the car in question. The records 
of the company disclosed that employees of the defendant 
had discovered the broken tie band. Testimony was also 
introduced that the usual and customary practice was 
to place a card on the car, indicating it was bad ordered 
and also indicating what was wrong with the car or its 
contents. Plaintiff and his foreman testified that they 
did not see a card on the car. Hence, there being a con-
flict in the evidence, the jury could determine that no card 
was placed upon the car in question. The jury could find 
that the defendant had found the defective tie band and 
had given no notice to the consignee or its employees 
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and had negligently placed the same in the yards of the 
Pacific F'ruit Express for the purpose of unloading. 
Also, the jury could find that merely to place a bad 
order card on a car in a place where it was not seen and 
that defendant did nothing further to call the attention 
of the consignee or its employees to the defective tie band, 
constituted negligence on its part in failing to give 
reasonably adequate warning of a known defect. 
Many cases could be cited to support the proposi-
tion that the defendant owed a duty to Rademann-
Guisto Company and its employees, including plaintiff, to 
make a reasonable inspection to determine whether the 
car could be safely unloaded and give special warning of 
any defect so found. We do not anticipate that there will 
be any dispute concerning this principle of law. See St. 
Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Ewan, 26 ·F'. 2d 619; Erie 
R. Co. v. Murphy, 108 F .. 2d 817; Hanson v. Ponder, 300 
S. W. 35; Heaven v. Pender, (1883) L. R. 11 Q. B. Div. 
503. This latter case is a much cited English case and is 
discussed at 41 A.L.R. 58. 
When defendant's witnesses testified that their con-
cern was whether the car could be safely transported, 
they were not discharging the duty imposed upon de-
fendant. The car was delivered by defendant to be un-
loaded and hence it duty extended not only to safe trans-
portation but safe unloading. In Erie R. Co. v. Murphy, 
supra, the court set forth the contention of the railroad as 
follows, ( p. 818) : 
"Appellant's first contention is that, as de-
livering carrier, it was under no duty so to in-
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spect a sealed car received fron1 another earrier 
as to ascertain '\Vhether it 'vas safe for unloading, 
but that only such inspection was required as 
'vould reveal 'vhether the car was reasonably fit 
for transportation." 
It then ans"'ered the contention as follows: 
"..._1\.ppellant's first contention is contrary to 
the great 'veight of authority. When injury in 
unloading a car is the proximate result of the 
car's unsafe condition, the delivering carrier is 
almost invariably held liable, if a reasonable in-
spection would have revealed the defect and the 
carrier gave no notice thereof. St. Louis-San 
Francisco Ry. Co. v. E'van, 8 Cir., 26 F. 2d 619; 
Copeland et al. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 8 Cir., 
293 F. 12; niissouri Pac. R. Co. v. S.ellers, 188 Ark. 
218, 65 S. W. 2d 14; Doering v. St. Louis & O'Fal-
lon Ry. Co., et al., Mo. App. 63 S. W. 2d 450; Grif-
fin v. Payne, Director General of Railroads, 95 
N.J.L. 490, 113 A. 247; Roy v. Georgia R. & Bank-
ing Co., et al., 17 Ga. App. 34, 86 S. E. 328; Cor-
bett v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co., 215 Mass. 435, 
102 N. E. 648. Cf. Wheeling & L. E. Ry. Co. v. 
Rupp, 27 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 212. 
"Since appellant was under a duty to appellee 
to exercise reasonable care to discover and give 
timely notice of defects that might imperil appel-
lee's safety, the only remaining question is 
whether there was substantial evidence that appel-
lant failed to perform that duty." 
In this latter case the wheel of a hand truck being 
used by plaintiff fell through a hole in the floor of the 
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car causing plaintiff's foot to be caught between the floor 
and the loaded truck. The court concluded: 
"* * * Though the evidence was conflicting 
as to whether an inspector should have carded a 
car as unsafe or defective under the circumstances 
here presented, there was substantial evidence 
from which a jury could reasonably infer that an 
ordinary inspection would have revealed the hole 
in the car floor and that, it having been discover-
ed, reasonable care required that notice be given 
that the condition of the floor might make unload-
ing perilous." 
We respectfully submit that the court correctly ruled 
that a question of fact for the jury was presented by the 
evidence on the proposition of defendant's negligence 
proximately causing the injuries to plaintiff. 
CONCLUSION 
Under the foregoing authorities it is apparent that 
the trial court erroneously denied to plaintiff his right 
to a jury trial when it directed a verdict in favor of the 
defendant. For such reason we submit that this Honor-
able Court should reverse the case and send it back to the 
trial court to be tried and the questions of fact deter-
mined by a tribunal selected to try cases involving con-
flicting issues of fact. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, ROBERTS 
& BLACK 
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